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Preface
∵
Pragmatism is experiencing resurgence. This is especially so among scholars 
interested in cognitive science, with the field undergoing a pragmatic turn 
away from representational models and many embracing embodied approach-
es, standpoints obviously favored by classical figures such as William James 
and John Dewey. Anthony Chemero, Shaun Gallagher and Richard Menary are 
among the more prominent scholars involved in this. Ranking neuroscientists, 
such as Antonio Damasio and Jay Schulkin, embrace classical pragmatism too. 
Relatedly, a burgeoning neuropragmatic movement is gaining traction, which, 
in spite of its brain-centered name, does not simply import science into phi-
losophy. It in fact criticizes growing neurohype and emphasizes the relevance 
of pragmatism not only to the sciences, but also to culture, politics and more, 
with the aim of humanizing science and scientifically informing philosophy. 
It was with all this in mind that researchers from 11 countries gathered at the 
American University in Cairo in October 2015 to discuss pragmatism in the 
context of cognitive science. Speakers applied pragmatic thinking to areas 
ranging from neuroscience and plant cognition to artificial intelligence and 
computational models of emotion to politics, ethics, art and cognitive science 
of religion, while also addressing longstanding quandaries such as skepticism 
and the mind-body problem. This issue of Contemporary Pragmatism offers a 
selection of papers, on some of these topics, collected from this international 
event.
The first article, by Tibor Solymosi, who coined the term “neuropragma-
tism,” focuses on an issue that centrally preoccupied Dewey—democracy—
and the threat posed to it by what Mark Tschaepe calls “dopamine democracy.” 
Solymosi begins by reviewing Dewey’s early, middle and late thought on the 
mind, brain and nervous system, then ponders how mass addiction to digital 
devices diminishes what Dewey understood to be healthy functioning, and dis-
cusses the troubling ramifications that follow. Solymosi considers how neuro-
pragmatic outlooks might be employed to meet political challenges generated 
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The second paper is in the open and critical spirit of pragmatism and phi-
losophy generally. Conor Morris identifies areas in neuropragmatism that he 
finds problematic. Specifically, he asks whether the two foremost advocates 
of neuropragmatism—Tibor Solymosi and John Shook—advance a question-
able understanding of Dewey’s principle of continuity, thereby undermining 
the very melioristic dimensions that their movement proposes. Morris’s cri-
tique revolves around the assertion that changes introduced by culture and 
especially language mean that human domains such as ethics cannot fruitfully 
be understood as predominantly neuroactivities or even biological ones. One 
virtue, among others, of Morris’s piece is that in the process of criticizing neu-
ropragmatism, it offers a concise yet thorough introduction to the reader who 
wishes to know more about it.
The last four articles in this special issue are linked by the concept of em-
bodiment. The first of these is authored by Lana Kühle, and deals with a classic 
quandary: the hard problem of consciousness. To address this, Kühle focuses 
on James. She explores his embodied theory of emotions in light of current 
cognitive science; and she offers a Jamesian account of inattentive interocep-
tion that, as she argues, opens avenues of progress on the hard problem. Kühle 
is particularly versed in enactive cognitive science and phenomenology. So, in 
addition to the above mentioned, she adds to a growing body of scholarship 
linking pragmatism to phenomenology and enactivism.
The next contributor, Ewa Chudoba, focuses on matters close to Dewey’s 
heart: art and aesthetics. She takes up a critique of Richard Shusterman’s work 
on somatic consciousness. She attends particularly to the Deweyan concepts 
of pervasive and unifying quality, important in Dewey’s aesthetic thought, and 
concludes that these ideas cast doubt on some of Shusterman’s views, spe-
cifically his emphasis on internal control of bodily processes. In a Deweyan 
vein, she points out that mechanisms that Shusterman promotes for inner 
control—for example, breathing exercises—involve interactions with air and 
hence surrounding environment, so that the rhythm of the lungs and quality of 
the experience partly depend on altitude, dustiness, odors, humidity, tempera-
ture, in other words, on factors not in our control. She concludes that Shuster-
man strays in unfruitful directions just where he most emphatically departs 
from Dewey.
Following Chudoba is Roman Madzia’s extraordinarily interesting paper 
in which he advances a Deweyan situated account to argue that plants have 
cognition. Pragmatists and contemporary embodied theorists both emphasize 
movement, and Madzia points out that plants engage in life-sustaining move-
ments. He specifically proposes that root systems integrate sensory input into 
adaptive behavior and thus can be seen as sensorimotor organs. Plants have 
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signaling systems that employ chemicals such as dopamine, glutamate and se-
rotonin. Shoots, roots and flowers move to better reach nutrients or sunlight, to 
avoid dangerous soil conditions or parasites and to engage in sexual reproduc-
tion. Some plants even selectively respond with chemical defenses to ward off 
predators. Moreover, some appear to communicate aerially via organic com-
pounds and other mechanisms. Regarding plant cognition, Madzia urges that 
representationalist discourse should be avoided and that we should interpret 
their activities in terms of organism-environment coupling, self-organization, 
emergence and perhaps Gibson’s theory of affordances, which was, of course, 
pragmatically inspired.
Rounding out the collection is Matthew Crippen’s “Embodied Cognition 
and Perception: Dewey, Science and Skepticism.” In line with Madzia’s piece, 
Crippen argues that Dewey anticipated 4E cognition, especially enactivist 
views. He locates inspiration for Dewey’s account in the science of his day, 
especially biology but also physics, and contrasts his conception of mind 
with dominant Modern era ones and recent standard models, which both 
emphasize an inner-outer divide wherein the world is represented inside the 
organism—an outlook clearly motivating skepticism. Crippen maintains that 
Dewey’s situated view combats skepticism by insisting that things registered by 
us, whether firsthand or through scientific instruments, are consequences of 
our conduct, and should therefore be evaluated according to action-scenarios 
generating them; and that this lends epistemic basis for everyday experiences 
and scientific knowledge since both are generated by changes occurring in our 
surroundings, as opposed to just our heads.
In small and various ways—but ones I cannot resist mentioning—this 
collection marks some historical firsts. It is generated from what was likely 
Egypt’s first international conference on pragmatism and certainly its first on 
pragmatism and cognitive science; and we had, delivering his first keynote ad-
dress, Tibor Solymosi, who first used the term “neuropragmatism.” Much more 
importantly, however, this collection is an example of philosophy doing what 
philosophy has historically done, and living up to the pragmatic ideal of tack-
ling issues and problems that have import beyond the world of professional, 
academic philosophy.
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